

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 14353 01 OF 02 111232Z

42

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 074154

O 111045Z SEP 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8613

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 14353

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, UR, US

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON GROMYKO

REF: STATE 222590; STATE 221445

1. SUMMARY: DURING 55-MINUTE FAREWELL CALL ON GROMYKO SEPT. 10, I STRESSED ACHIEVEMENTS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS DURING MY TENURE AND NEED FOR HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION TO RELATIONSHIP TO AVOID DETERIORATION. AMONG BILATERAL AREAS REQUIRING CLOSE ATTENTION, I CITED MARITIME AND CIVIL AIR AGREEMENTS AND RADITION PROBLEM; AMONG INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST. GROMYKO ALSO EXPRESSED FIRM SOVIET INTENT TO WORK FOR IMPROVEMENT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT WAS UNYIELDING ON SPECIFIC ISSUES RAISED, ALTHOUGH HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN DISCUSSING THEM DURING HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO U.S. DESPITE SHARP DISAGREEMENT ON SOME OF ISSUES RAISED, MEETING WAS ENTIRELY CORDIAL AND WAS FOLLOWED BY LAVISH FAREWELL LUNCHEON HOSTED BY GROMYKOS. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING INTIAL PLESANTRIES, GROMYKO EXPRESSED REGRET THAT I WAS DEPARTING AND SPOKE FAVORABLY OF WORK I HAD DONE WHILE IN MOSCOW, ALTHOUGH MY TOUR HAD BEEN RELATIVELY BRIEF. I SAID I WAS LEAVING MY POST WITH REGRET BUT THAT I WOULD NOT BE FAR AWAY EITHER GEOGRAPHICALLY OR FROM US-SOVIET RELATIONS IN POLITICAL

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 14353 01 OF 02 111232Z

SENSE AND HOPED TO ESTABLISH CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SOVIET

AMBASSADOR FALIN IN BONN. I TOLD HIM THAT U.S. OFFICIALS
LOOK FORWARD TO HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AND
ANTICIPATE FRUITFUL DISCUSSION AT THAT TIME.

3. LOOKING BACK OVER THE PERIOD OF MY STAY IN MOSCOW,
GROMYKO REMARKED THAT "MANY GOOD THINGS" HAD BEEN DONE,
AND THAT SUMMIT MEETINGS SINCE 1972 HAD BEEN MOST INTENSE
PERIOD IN HISTORY FOR US-SOVIET RELATIONS. HE COMPARED
THE THREE SUMMITS DURING AND JUST AFTER WORLD WAR II
WITH THE FIVE THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE 1972, AND
OBSERVED THAT THE LATTER HAD PRODUCED GOOD RESULTS. HE
THEN ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO MY GOVERNMENT THE MESSAGE
THAT THE SOVIET LINE REMAINS WHAT IT HAS BEEN, TO IMPROVE
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS A POSITION OF
PRINCIPLE WHICH WAS CONFIRMED BY THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS,
HE ADDED. I TOLD HIM THAT OUR POLICY OF ATTEMPTING
TO IMPROVE US-SOVIET RELATIONS ALSO REMAINS THE SAME,
AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE WHATEVER THE OUTCOME
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN NOVEMBER.

4. I THEN PROCEEDED TO COVER THE TALKING POINTS
PROVIDED IN STATE 222590 AND 221445 ON US-SOVIET
RELATIONS, THE MICROWAVE PROBLEM, AFRICA AND THE
MIDDLE EAST. SUMMING UP, I POINTED OUT THAT WE HAVE
INDEED MADE MUCH PROGRESS IN BUILDING A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE
RELATIONSHIP, AND ARE FOLLOWING A STEADY COURSE. WE
WANT IMPROVED RELATIONS, AND HOPE THAT THE PROBLEMS
WHICH HAVE ARISEN WILL BE GIVEN URGENT ATTENTION SO
THAT A DETERIORATION CAN BE AVOIDED.

5. GROMYKO REPLIED, TAKING UP THE QUESTIONS RAISED
IN TURN. WHILE HE IS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS
OF THE MARITIME AGREEMENT, HE CANNOT AGREE THAT THERE
HAVE BEEN VIOLATIONS, AND HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHY
THE U.S. IS RAISING "ARTIFICIAL IMPEDIMENTS" TO
IMPLEMENTATION. REGARDING THE CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT,
HE SAID THAT HE HAD STUDIED THIS SITUATION IN DETAIL,
AND THAT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT A VIOLATION HAS
OCCURRED. INDEED, THE U.S. SIDE HAS DEVIATED FROM PAST
AGREEMENTS. HE MUSED THAT U.S. MAY HAVE A PROBLEM BETWEEN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 14353 01 OF 02 111232Z

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE AIRLINE, BUT THIS IS NOT
OF SOVIET CONCERN. HE THEN VOLUNTEERED THAT IT WOULD
PERHAPS BE A GOOD IDEA TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THESE
AGREEMENTS WHEN HE IS IN WASHINGTON.

6. ON THE MICROWAVE SITUATION (GROMYKO TERMED IT "THE
NOTORIOUS RADIATION"), HE SAID IN SOMEWHAT HEATED TONES
THAT HE COULD ONLY REPEAT WHAT HE HAD SAID DURING OUR

LAST MEETING ON THIS SUBJECT. (AT THAT TIME HE HAD FLATLY DENIED THAT ANY SIGNALS WERE INTENTIONALLY DIRECTED AGAINST THE EMBASSY.) HE THEN ADDED THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE ARE "INFLATING" THIS QUESTION, AND THAT ANY PROBLEMS WITH OUR STAFF OR WITH PUBLIC OPINION ON THE MATTER WERE THE RESULT OF OUR TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE, AND NOT OF SOVIET ACTION.

7. TURNING TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, GROMYKO ASKED RHETORICALLY, "WHAT DO YOU EXPECT? DO YOU EXPECT A POSITIVE EVALUATION OF YOUR SUPPORT FOR RACIST REGIMES? WE WOULD NOT BE OURSELVES IF WE APPROVED THAT." HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT SOVIET POLICY HAD ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLE OF AFRICAN MAJORITY GOVERNMENT, WHEREAS THE U.S. HAS SUPPORTED THE RACISTS. IN DOING SO, THE U.S. HELPED TO CREATE THE CURRENT PROBLEMS, AND NOW WISHES TO GET CREDIT FOR SOLVING PROBLEMS IT HELPED CREATE. WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD DO NOW IS TO SPEAK OUT UNEQUIVOCALLY IN CONDEMNATION OF RACIST POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA. INSTEAD OF DOING SO, HOWEVER, HE CLAIMED THAT U.S. IS MANEUVERING BEHIND THE SCENES AND TRYING TO ALLAY (SMYAGCHIT') THE CONFRONTATION. HE CONSIDERED THIS A SLIPPERY PATH. U.S. MUST EITHER SUPPORT MAJORITY RULE UNEQUIVOCALLY OR IS IN FACT AGAINST IT. SOVIET POSITION, WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD BEEN CONSISTENT FOR NEARLY 60 YEARS, IS THAT THERE MUST BE RULE BY THE PEOPLE AND THERE CAN BE NO COMPROMISE ON THIS ISSUE. EITHER THE PEOPLE HAVE POWER OR THEY DO NOT, AND THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ONE-FOURTH POWER OR ONE-HALF POWER.

8. CONTINUING ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, GROMYKO SAID THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO NOTED THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 14353 01 OF 02 111232Z

IS CONDUCTING HIS AFRICAN POLICY UNDER THE COVER OF ANTI-SOVIET SLOGANS, AND IS MISSING NO OPPORTUNITY TO ATTACK THE SOVIET UNION. ALMOST EVERY DAY HE READS SOME NEW STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY DENOUNCING THE SOVIET UNION. AS FOR ANGOLA, SOVIETS ARE DOING NOTHING. THEY HAVE EVEN REFRAINED FROM SENDING A CORRESPONDENT THERE, AND PERHAPS THIS IS CARRYING RESTRAINT TOO FAR. THE SOVIET UNION, HE SAID, CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SECRETARY IS CONDUCTING AN ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN ON THIS ISSUE AND IS ACTING AS IF THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO SUBJUGATE SOUTHERN AFRICA, SINCE HE MUST KNOW THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE. AS FOR SOVIET PRESS TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE, IT HAS NOT SAID ONE-TENTH OF WHAT IT SHOULD, AND U.S. CANNOT EXPECT SOVIET PRESS TO BE MOUTHPIECE FOR U.S. POLICY WHEN SOVIETS IN DISAGREEMENT WITH LATTER.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 14353 02 OF 02 111245Z

47

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 074304

O 111045Z SEP 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8614

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 14353

NODIS

9. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, GROMYKO REMARKED THAT THE ISSUES ARE VERY COMPLEX AND HE COULD TALK A LONG TIME ABOUT THEM. WHEN U.S. LEADERS SAID, AS FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON AND PRESIDENT FORD HAVE BOTH DONE, THAT U.S. OBJECTIVE IN MIDDLE EAST IS PEACE, SOVIETS AGREED AND REACTED POSITIVELY TO THESE ASSURANCES. FROM THIS POINT, HOWEVER, OUR POLICIES BEGAN TO DIVERGE, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO THE PALESTINIANS AND, MORE RECENTLY, LEBANON. THE U.S., HE ASSERTED, COULD DO MORE TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN THE REGION, BUT DOES NOT WISH TO. THE SOVIETS CONSIDER THIS A MISTAKE, AND BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. IS MOTIVATED MORE BY TRANSITORY AND TEMPORARY CONSIDERATIONS RATHER THAN BY LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES. HE ASKED WHY U.S. HAD NOT CONDEMNED BLOODSHED IN LEBANON, WHICH HAS REACHED APPALLING PROPORTIONS, AND OPINED THAT U.S. WOULD GAIN NOTHING IN LONG RANGE FROM A POLICY ON TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. WE HAVE NO DISPUTE ON THE NEED FOR PEACE, HE REITERATED, BUT CANNOT FIND A COMMON LANGUAGE ON CONCRETE ISSUES. AS FOR ISRAEL, SOVIET UNION RECOGNIZES ITS RIGHT TO EXISTENCE AS A STATE AND HAS SAID SO PUBLICLY ON MANY OCCASIONS, BUT U.S. UNWILLING TO RECOGNIZE RIGHTS OF PALESTINIANS. IF ISRAEL WISHES TO LIVE IN PEACE ON ITS RIGHTFUL TERRITORY, A SETTLEMENT CAN BE REACHED, BUT IF IT WISHES TO TAKE OTHER TERRITORIES AND TO CREATE ITS EMPIRE IN THE REGION, THEN THERE WILL BE NO PEACE. SUMMING UP, HE REITERATED THAT SOVIET POLICY REMAINS CONSTANT, AND IS BASED ON LONG-RANGE CONSIDERATIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 14353 02 OF 02 111245Z

10. I THEN UNDERTOOK A BRIEF COMMENT ON AND REBUTTAL OF GROMYKO'S MAJOR POINTS. ON MARITIME MATTERS I NOTED THE FACT THAT U.S. SHIPS WERE NOT OBTAINING THE ONE-THIRD PORTION OF THE GRAIN TRADE CALLED FOR UNDER THE AGREEMENT. ON CIVIL AVIATION, THERE WAS A SERIOUS IMBALANCE IN THE OPERATION OF THE AGREEMENT IN THE SOVIET'S FAVOR. WE HAD MADE PROPOSALS TO REMEDY THE SITUATION AND I HOPED THEY WOULD BE CONSIDERED FURTHER. THERE WAS ALSO EVIDENCE OF IMPROPER SOVIET CONDUCT IN CONNECTION WITH TICKETING. ON ALL OF THESE POINTS, I AGREED THAT A FURTHER DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON WOULD BE HELPFUL. REGARDING THE MICROWAVE SITUATION I ASSURED HIM THAT WE WERE IN NO WAY INFLATING THE MATTER, AND INDEED HAD ACTED WITH RESTRAINT, BUT AS LONG AS SITUATION PERSISTS, IT WILL BE ISSUE BETWEEN US. REGARDING SOUTHERN AFRICA, I POINTED OUT THAT, CONTRARY TO HIS ASSERTIONS, THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY HAVE INDEED SPOKEN OUT FORCEFULLY AND REPEATEDLY IN FAVOR OF MAJORITY RULE, AND OUR POLICES ARE DIRECTED SOLELY TOWARD ACHIEVING MAJORITY RULE WITHOUT A BLOOD BATH. WE DO NOT EXPECT PRAISE FROM THE SOVIET PRESS, BUT DO EXPECT IT TO REFRAIN FROM A DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATION OF OUR POLICIES AND A LINE APPARENTLY DESIGNED ONLY TO INFLAME THE SITUATION AND IMPEDE A SOLUTION. REGARDING THE MIDDLE EAST, I NOTED THAT IT IS INDEED UNFORTUNATE THAT OUR VIEWS REGARDING PRACTICAL STEPS TO BE TAKEN DIVERGE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS SHOULD BE ADHERED TO, AND REGARDING LEBANON WE ARE IN FAVOR OF ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND OPPOSED TO INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE POWERS. I FIRMLY REJECTED HIS IMPLICATION THAT WE SOMEHOW FAVOR BLOODSHED IN THAT UNFORTUNATE COUNTRY.

11. GROMYKO CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT HE IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WHILE HE IS IN THE UNITED STATES. HE PLANS TO LEAVE FOR NEW YORK SEPT. 20, AND SAID THAT HE IS IN TOUCH WITH DEPARTMENT REGARDING THE BEST DATES FOR HIM TO COME TO WASHINGTON. THE MEETING CONCLUDED SO THAT WE COULD PROCEED TO LUNCHEON.

12. DESPITE SHARP DIFFERENCES OF VIEW IN OUR EXCHANGE, THE MEETING WAS CONDUCTED IN A CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE. THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 14353 02 OF 02 111245Z

LUNCHEON FOR MRS. STOESSEL AND ME IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING

MY CALL, HOSTED BY GROMYKO AND HIS WIFE, SEEMED PARTICULARLY LAVISH AND INCLUDED THE SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE EMBASSY AND THEIR WIVES. OUR TOASTS WERE UPBEAT, STRESSING THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE PAST AND OUR DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. GROMYKO IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION ASKED ME TO PASS HIS BEST REGARDS TO THE SECRETARY, WHOM HE LOOKS FORWARD TO SEEING SOON.

13. BESIDES MY CALL ON GROMYKO, THE ONLY OTHER FAREWELL CALL ARRANGED WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS WAS WITH DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS KIRILLIN (SEPTTEL). WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT PODGORNYY (WHO USUALLY RECEIVES DEPARTING AMBASSADORS OF MAJOR POWERS) AND KOSYGIN ARE STILL ON VACATION, AND NO RESPONSE HAS BEEN GIVEN TO MY REQUEST FOR A CALL ON BREZHNEV OR TO MY SUGGESTION THAT IF KOSYGIN UNAVAILABLE I WOULD LIKE TO SEE MAZUROV. (AS FOR PODGORNYY, ONE MFA OFFICIAL INFORMED US THAT HE INTERRUPTED VACATION TO MEET BREZHNEV AT AIRPORT SEPT. 5, BUT LEFT MOSCOW AGAIN IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER.) I CONCLUDE THAT, ALTHOUGH PERSONAL EXPRESSIONS OF ESTEEM BY GROMYKO AND OTHER OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN MOST CORDIAL, THE PROTOCOL ASPECT OF MY DEPARTURE, WHILE QUITE CORRECT, HAS BEEN A BIT COOL, PERHAPS REFLECTING CURRENT PUBLIC LINE TOWARD THE U.S.
STOESSEL

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DETENTE, FOREIGN RELATIONS, MEETING REPORTS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 11 SEP 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976MOSCOW14353
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P840104-2058, N760006-0804
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760970/aaaachvx.tel
Line Count: 302
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 76 STATE 222590, 76 STATE 221445
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <27 APR 2004 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <19 AUG 2004 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON GROMYKO
TAGS: PFOR, PDIP, US, UR, XJ, XF, (STOESSEL, WALTER J JR), (GROMYKO, ANDREY ANDREYEVICH)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006